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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model where a competitive firm produces a single good
from labor and capital, with market clearing rates of return. Individuals are
heterogeneous in skills, with an endowment in capital/wealth increasing in
skill. Individuals aspire to a standard consumption level, with a constant
marginal propensity to consume out of income above this level. We define a
steady state of this model as an equilibrium where factor returns and wealth
shares remain constant. We calibrate the model to the US economy and
obtain that a steady state exists. We then study three variants of the model:
one with a higher rate of return for large capitals than for smaller ones,
one with social mobility, and one with a capital levy financing a lump sum
transfer. In all variants, a steady state exists. We also run the model starting
from the 2012 US wealth distribution and obtain convergence to the steady
state in the basic model as well as in all variants. Convergence takes a long
time and is non monotone, with factor returns and wealth shares moving
away from their steady state values for long periods.
Keywords: Piketty, dynamics of wealth accumulation, convergence to
steady state, spirit of capitalism, differential rates of return to capital, inter-
generational mobility, capital levy, US calibration.
JEL Codes: D31, D58, E37
1 Introduction
The recent book by Piketty (2014) has rekindled an interest in understanding
why wealth is so concentrated at the top of the distribution, an evident
phenomenon in several major economies, and especially in the US.
That wealth distributions are skewed to the right and display thick upper
tails has been known since Pareto’s “Cours d’Economie Politique” (1909).
Benhabib and Bisin (2016) survey the early literature developed to under-
stand the mechanisms at play in generating thick-tailed wealth distribu-
tions. All these early attempts were mechanical and lacked economic micro-
foundations. Beginning in the 1990s, economists have started to build micro-
founded models designed to understand the determinants of the properties
of wealth distributions. Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) survey this literature,
where the models reviewed are heterogeneous agent versions of standard neo-
classical growth models. Two types of model have been developed, dynastic
and life-cycle. In their words (p 23), “The dynastic model includes the infi-
nitely lived agent abstraction and assumes that people care for their descen-
dants as if they were themselves, and the life cycle model includes overlapping
generations of finitely lived agents who do not care about their descendants.
Thus, the main motive for saving (...) differs in these two types of models:
in dynastic models, people save to improve their descendants’consumption,
while in life cycle models, people save to improve their own consumption dur-
ing retirement.”In both cases, preferences are represented by the discounted
sum of a per period utility function.
Both types of model focus on the steady state (where variables grow at
a constant rate —perhaps zero—over time) and have trouble reproducing the
actual wealth distributions.1 The simplest versions of these models assume
that agents’earnings are deterministic. In the absence of shocks, there is
no need for precautionary savings in the dynastic models, so that the steady
state wealth distribution inherits mechanically all the properties of the initial
distribution. As for the deterministic life cycle models, Huggett (1996) shows
that calibrated models generate aggregate savings that are too low to explain
the US savings rate, and too little wealth concentration in the upper tail.
The next step undertaken by the literature has consisted in adding unin-
surable idiosyncratic shocks to labor earnings. The seminal papers have
adopted the dynastic approach and are due to Bewley (1983) and Aiya-
1Most work has been done on the US case.
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gari (1994). In these models, where agents save for precautionary reasons
to smooth consumption, the key determinant of the wealth distribution is
the volatility of individual earnings, not permanent differences in earnings
across households (Constantinides and Duffi e 1996). The literature has also
added uninsurable labor shocks to life cycle models. Huggett (1996) further
adds uninsurable lifetime uncertainty, generating both precautionary savings
and accidental bequests. In all cases, models under-estimate the fraction of
wealth accumulated at the top of the distribution. More recently, the litera-
ture has introduced stochastic returns for capital as well as labor. Benhabib
et al (2011) obtain a stationary wealth distribution which is Pareto in its
right tail, with this tail populated by dynasties which have realized a long
streak of high rates of return on capital, so that capital income risk, rather
than stochastic labor income, drives the properties of this right tail.2
In this paper, we develop in Section 2 a deterministic dynastic model
with infinitely lived agents who differ in skills. We first depart from the
literature surveyed above in how we model individual preferences. Agents
do not maximize a discounted infinite sum of consumption over time, but
rather a single-period utility function of consumption and savings, repeated
in each period. Moreover, we assume there is a socially expected standard of
living for people in this society. It is not subsistence consumption, but rather
the consumption level to which ordinary people aspire, which is generated
by advertising and the media (in the US, this level would define a successful
middle-class life).3 The marginal propensity to consume out of income is
assumed to be unity below this standard consumption level, and a constant
lower than one above this level. One way to interpret these preferences is that
agents desire to consume and to accumulate wealth for its own sake. They
do so because ‘money is life’s report card,’as the caption of a New Yorker
cartoon said. In this view, accumulation for its own sake is the motivation for
most members of the wealthy class, for success in the game of life is judged by
one’s wealth. As noted by Cooper (1979), “Persons in the wealth category we
are now discussing have more current income than they can expend. Beyond a
certain point, the real value of greater wealth is power, control, and security”.
Max Weber (1905) has argued that private accumulation of wealth as an end
2See Quadrini (2000) for a dynastic model with stochastic returns to entrepreneurship
under market imperfections and financial constraints, and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)
for a life cycle model building on Quadrini (2000).
3See Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) for a life cycle model with subsistence con-
sumption.
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in itself, rather than for consumption purpose —a behavior he dubbed the
spirit of capitalism—has been the main driver of Industrial Revolution in
Europe. Piketty and Zucman (2015, p1346) study a similar (although not
equivalent) “Wealth-in-the-Utility-Function”, where the utility function is
defined over consumption and (the increase in) wealth, and justify the latter
by referring to wealth as “a signal of their ability or virtue”.4 Our first
objective is then to assess the consequences of assuming such preferences on
the dynamics of capital accumulation in a model calibrated to reflect broadly
the US economy.
We assume that the initial distribution of wealth is monotone increasing
in an individual’s skill. A firm, using a CES production function whose in-
puts are effi ciency units of labor and capital, maximizes profits. Consumers-
workers offer inelastically their entire endowment of skilled labor to the firm;
they demand the consumption good and supply capital to the firm in order
to maximize preferences described above. The interest rate and real wage
equilibrate the markets for labor and capital. There are proportional taxes
on capital and labor income, the revenues from which are returned as a de-
mogrant to each worker. Skills are assumed to increase at an exogenous rate,
as does the expected standard of living. The main fundamental changing over
time is the distribution of capital/wealth.
The literature surveyed above concentrates on establishing the properties
of the steady state of the economy (where real rates of return, capital output
ratio and wealth shares remain constant over time). This approach is incom-
plete, as recognized by Benhabib et al (2015) who write “This comparison
implicitly assumes that the wealth distribution for the U.S. is close to sta-
tionary. This might in general not be the case if the wealth distribution is hit
frequently enough by aggregate shocks like wars, major business cycle events
(e.g., a depression), changes in tax schemes, social insurance institutions,
and so on; see Saez and Piketty (2003). We leave the study of the transition
of the distribution of wealth for future work”(p 16). Our second objective
is then to go beyond the study of the steady state equilibrium and to also
investigate whether and how the model converges to this steady state when
we start, at period zero, with the wealth distribution observed in the US in
2012 by Saez and Zucman (2016).
4Our formulation generates a consumption pattern reflecting Saez and Zucman (2016)’s
evidence of substantial saving rate differentials across wealth levels, so that, in Benhabib
et al (2015)’s words, “the rich can get richer through savings, while the poor may not save
enough to escape a poverty trap”(p 3).
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Our third objective is to assess how the introduction of three relevant de-
partures from our basic “vanilla”model affects both the steady state and the
convergence to this state from the 2012 US wealth distribution. First, intro-
ducing heterogenous rates of returns is often mentioned as a promising way
to move the models closer to explaining actual wealth data, and especially
its concentration at the top (see for instance Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997),
which mention that “the portfolio of wealthy households typically includes
assets that yield higher returns than the assets of poorer households”(p 29),
and Benhabib and Bisin (2016)). There is also increasing empirical support
for this form of heterogeneity, even though Piketty and Zucman (2015) stress
the poor quality of the data. Piketty (2014, chapter 2) estimates these rates
of return using university endowments, which are public information in the
United States because non-profit institutions must report these data. He
obtains returns (over the 1980-2010 period) ranging from 6.2% for endow-
ments less than $100 million to 10.2% for endowments much larger than $1
billion. Saez and Zucman (2016) find the same pattern for the universe of
U.S. foundations, and Piketty and Zucman (2015, Table 15.1) using Forbes
global wealth rankings. Saez and Zucman (2016, online appendix, Tables
B29, B30, and B31) show mildly increasing pre-tax returns in wealth over
the period 1980-2012. Administrative data from Scandinavian countries also
show pre-tax returns increasing in wealth. Fagereng et al (2015, 2016) find
returns significantly increasing in wealth only for high wealth classes, above
the top 10%, in Norway. Bach et al (2015) find higher returns on large wealth
portfolios for Sweden. In section 3, we construct a highly simplified model
with one rate of return for capitals in the top 1% of the wealth distribution
and a smaller rate of return for capitals in the bottom 99%. We continue to
assume that the average rate of return clears the capital market.
In Section 4, we add intergenerational mobility to our original model. We
take a generation to last for 50 years, and model this by assuming that each
individual has a 2% probability of dying each year, upon which his capital
passes down, without taxation, to his single offspring. The offspring’s skill
level —and hence her labor earnings —are not inherited, but are taken to be
determined by the income intergenerational mobility matrix of Chetty et al
(2014).5
Finally, in the spirit of Piketty (2014), we introduce in Section 5 a capital
5Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) study empirically bequests motives in the US and obtain
that roughly three-fourths of the elderly single population in their sample has a bequest
motive, which can best be described as egoistic, namely “a desire to have positive net
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levy on the top wealth decile, whose proceeds are redistributed as a lump
sum transfer.
In all variants of the model, we obtain that a steady state exists. We
also obtain convergence to this steady state when we start with the 2012 US
wealth distribution. The main results obtained with the basic version of the
model as well as with each variant are summarized at the end of each section,
and we recap our main results in Section 6.
2 The basic model
We present the model and solve for its equilibrium date by date in section 2.1,
and we solve for its steady-state (where real rates of return, capital output
ratio and wealth shares remain constant over time) in section 2.2. We then
calibrate the model to the modern US economy in section 2.3 and describe
our numerical results in section 2.4.
2.1 Presentation of the basic model
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals who differ in their skill






denotes the average skill. We use the subscript t to denote the date at
which a variable is measured. The model starts at period t = 0, with a
distribution of wealth denoted by S0(s). We assume that wealth S0(s) is
monotone increasing in s, and that skills increase (exogenously) by a factor
(1 + g) per period.
There is a single good in the economy. Preferences are non-traditional.
We assume there is a socially expected standard of living for people in this
society, produced by a consumption level c0 at date 0. This expected con-
sumption level increases by a factor of (1 + g) per period. We do not call
this subsistence consumption —we set it at $100,000 in the simulations. It
is the consumption level to which ordinary people aspire, which is generated
worth upon death”. They model this desire with a per-period utility which is an increasing
function of both consumption (if alive) and bequest (if dead)—i.e., the counterpart of the
“wealth in utility function”used in our model and in Piketty and Zucman (2015).
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by advertising and the media (in the US, this level would define a success-
ful middle-class life). A suffi ciently wealthy individual at date t chooses her
consumption c and investment I to maximize a Stone-Geary utility function
as follows:
max (ct − c0(1 + g)t−1)αI1−αt (1)
subject to
ct + It ≤ yt(s),
ct ≥ c0(1 + g)t−1,
where yt(s) is the income of individual s at date t. If there is no solution
to program (1), because income is insuffi cient to purchase the consumption
level c0(1 + g)t−1, then the individual consumes out of wealth. To be precise,
ct(s) =

yt(s) + St−1(s) if yt(s) + St−1(s) ≤ (1 + g)t−1c0 (case 1)
(1 + g)t−1c0 if yt(s) ≤ (1 + g)t−1c0 ≤ yt(s) + St−1(s) (case 2)
(1 + g)t−1c0 + α (yt(s)− (1 + g)t−1c0) if yt(s) > (1 + g)t−1c0 (case 3)
(2)
In case 1, the individual consumes his income plus his wealth St−1(s), and
those together do not suffi ce to generate the socially expected consumption
of c0(1 + g)t−1. In case 2, when her income does not suffi ce to allow socially
expected consumption but her total asset position does, she consumes exactly
the socially acceptable consumption level. In case 3, where her income alone
suffi ces to allow socially acceptable consumption, she solves program (1) with




−St−1(s) ≤ 0 if case 1
yt(s)− c0(1 + g)t−1 ≤ 0 if case 2
yt(s)− ct(s) > 0 if case 3
(3)
The dynamics of wealth are given by
St(s) = St−1(s) + It(s). (4)
We now turn to the production side of the economy. A single firm pro-










where y, K and L are per capita income, capital, and labor in effi ciency
units. The only technical change in the model is induced by the exogenous
increase in labor skills. The firm faces an interest rate r and a real wage per
effi ciency unit of labor w, and maximizes profits. We denote by d the annual
rate of capital depreciation.
The firm’s profit is defined as
y(Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (rt + d)Kt,
whose differentiation gives the following FOC for the demands for labor













Note that the firm replaces depreciated capital from income, so that the
investor can cash out his entire capital stock at the end of the period, which
explains why the depreciation does not appear in equation (4).








(1 + g)t−1sdF (s) = (1 + g)t−1s̄. (9)
Using (5) and (9) in (6) and (7), the FOCs with respect to L and K
simplify to, respectively,























Finally, we assume an exogenously given income tax rate τ , the revenues
from which are returned to citizens as a demogrant. Thus income for an
agent of type s in year t is given by

















{s |St(s) = 0}
as the highest skill level with no wealth at time t.
Definition 1 A steady-state of the basic model is an equilibrium of the model
defined in section 2.1, where rt = r, wt = w, s1(t) = s1, for all t, and where
the variables yt(s), ct(s), It(s), Kt, Lt, St(s) all grow at rate g.
We can then represent
yt(s) = (1 + g)
t−1y∗(s), t ≥ 1
St(s) = (1 + g)
t−1S∗(s), t ≥ 0
Kt = (1 + g)
t−1K∗, t ≥ 1
Lt = (1 + g)
t−1s̄, t ≥ 1.





















Similarly, from the FOC (10) with respect to L , we obtain












By definition of s1,
y∗(s) = (1− τ)ws+ τ(ws̄+ rK∗) ≤ c0 for all s ≤ s1.
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We can then define
s1 =
c0 − τ(ws̄+ rK∗)
(1− τ)w . (16)
Observe that there cannot be case 2 agents (see (2)) at the steady state —
i.e., agents with positive wealth but negative investments—since their wealth
would decrease at every date, contradicting the definition of a steady state.
Hence, all those with s > s1 do invest and are such that
St(s) = St−1(s) + (1− α)
(
yt(s)− c0(1 + g)t−1
)
.






















+ τ (ws̄+ rK∗)− c0
)





(1− τ)ws+ τ(ws̄+ rK∗)− c0
γ




1− α − r(1− τ).
Using (8) together with (18), we obtain:
(γ − τr (1− F (s1)))K∗ = (1−τ)w
∫ ∞
s1
sdF (s)+(1−F (s1))(τws̄−c0). (19)
Recall that the lower bound of the integral on the RHS, s1, depends on K∗
(see equation (16)). Existence of the steady state depends on the existence
of a solution to the equation (19), an equation in the single unknown K∗.
Observe also from equation (18) that the distribution of wealth at equilibrium
is linear in s for s > s1.
If a steady state equilibrium exists, then we obtain by definition that the
wealth of every s grows at rate (1 +g). (This is obviously true for those with
wealth zero.) Therefore, the fraction of total wealth owned by any sub-class
of the population is constant.
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2.3 Calibration
We start with the calibration of the production function. Recall that the
production function has the CES form given by (5). We choose δ = 0.85,
and we stress at the end of section 2.4 that our results are not affected as
we increase δ from 0.85 to 1.25. One period is deemed to be one calendar
year. The capital income ratio is 4.5 in the U.S. Depreciation is about 10%
of GNP, which suggests a rate of depreciation d = 0.02. We assume that
g = 0.02. The distribution of skills is taken to be lognormal. The unit of
skill has no meaning: we take the median skill level to be 0.85 and the mean
s̄ to be 1. We then have that L = 1 at period 1. We develop in Annex 1 how
we calibrate the production function.
As for preferences, we choose c0 = 100 and α = 0.6, based on the fact that
the propensity to consume for the wealthy is about 0.6 out of income. There
are many estimates of the marginal propensity to consume of the wealthy (see
Carroll et al (2014)), which include 0.6. We chose this value as it generates
an aggregate savings rate in our models of about 9%, conforming roughly
with reality.6
Finally, the taxation rate τ is set at 0.35 throughout the paper.
2.4 Numerical Results: Steady state and convergence
A steady state exists for the parameter values detailed in section 2.3. The





Table 1: Steady state allocation
Observe first that r(1−τ) = 4.11%, so that r(1−τ) > g is consistent with
constant wealth shares in the steady state. The value of the capital output
ratio is, at 4.45, very close to the targeted value of 4.5 used to calibrate the
parameters of the production function (see Annex 1). Also, Piketty (2014)
6According to US census data, the savings rate has varied between 5% and 15% over
the last forty years.
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computes that the share of capital income, net of depreciation, in GNP is
28% (see Annex 1), from which we infer that r = 6.22%, which is very close





= (1 + g)g
S∗
(1 + g)y(K∗, s̄)




As for the wealth distribution, 84% of individuals have no wealth at the
steady state equilibrium, with wealth increasing linearly in skill for the top
16% of individuals. The steady state distribution of wealth is summarized in
Table 2, where we compare it with the actual wealth distribution taken from
Saez and Zucman (2016, Appendix Table B1).
Group Wealth share in
steady state actual
bottom 50% 0 0
top 10% 92% 77.2%
top 5% 68.7% 64.6%
top 1% 25.4% 41.8%
top 0.5% 15.4% 34.5%
top 0.1% 4.5% 22%
top 0.01% 0.7% 11.2%
Table 2: Wealth shares at steady state equilibrium and in Saez-Zucman
(2016)
The steady state equilibrium nearly reproduces the wealth shares accru-
ing to the bottom 50% and to the top 5%, but under-estimates both the
share going to the “patrimonial middle-class”(from 5th to 9th decile) and,
especially, to the very top (1% to 0.01%) of the wealth distribution. Observe
also that the under-estimation increases as one focuses on the very top of the
distribution, since the actual wealth share of the top 1% is 1.64 times higher
in reality than in the computed steady state, with this ratio increasing to
2.24 for the top 0.5%, 4.89 for the top 0.1% and 16 for the top 0.01%.
7The share of capital income, including depreciation, in GNP is 37% in our steady
state.
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The rapidity with which the actual wealth share at the top of the distrib-
ution has increased in recent years is much greater than occurs in simulations
of convergence to the steady state. We attribute this phenomenon to imper-
fections in competition that we have not modelled—for instance, the assault
upon unionization in the US since the Reagan presidency and global factors,
such as the rise of China.
If this analysis is correct, then the fact that wealth is becoming more
concentrated in reality is either due to a process of convergence to the steady
state, or to a departure of reality from the model. Our next step is then
to check the convergence to the steady equilibrium, starting from the Saez
and Zucman (2016)’s distribution. More precisely, we assume that the initial
distribution S0(s) is linear by parts over s, with 7 different brackets repro-
ducing Saez and Zucman (2016)’s top brackets. Total capital per worker at
the beginning of period 1 is set at 4.5 times $108,300 (see section 2.3).
We run the model for 500 periods, as follows. For each period, we begin
with the wealth function St−1(s) at the beginning of date t. Kt and Lt are
determined by (8) and (9). Equations (10) and (11) determine wt and rt. In-
come yt is determined by (12). Consumption and investment are determined
by (2) and (3). St(s) is determined by (4). The next iteration begins.
The model converges to the steady state equilibrium, with a very inter-
esting convergence pattern. The equilibrium interest rate is lower at t = 1
(r1 =6.19%) than its steady value, and increases for the first 48 periods, to
reach a maximum of 6.69% (see Figure 1).8 It then decreases and converges
to the steady state value of 6.32%. A similar pattern of overshooting also
occurs for the equilibrium wage rate (see Figure 2), which starts at t = 1
at a higher level ($68,408) than the steady state, decreases for 48 periods to
reach a minimum of $66,055, and then increases and converges to the steady
state level of $67,750. In both cases, the equilibrium rate of return remains
quite close to its steady state value, with a maximum gap (reached in both
cases at t = 48) of 5.75% for r and 2.5% for w.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here
The capital output ratio behaves very similarly to the equilibrium wage,
as can be seen in Figure 3. It starts above its steady state value, reaches its
8In all figures illustrating convergence, the horizontal line is set at the steady state level
of the variable depicted.
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minimum amount of 4.3 after 48 periods, and then increases to its steady
state value. At any point in time its value is within 3.7% of its steady state
value of 4.45.
Insert Figure 3 around here
We now move to the evolution of the wealth shares. The wealth share
of the patrimonial middle class (from 5th to 9th decile) decreases with time,
with a rate of decrease higher in the first periods, and a minimum attained
after 394 periods (see Figure 4). Here also, we observe a slight overshooting,
since the equilibrium share after 394 periods is, at 7.79%, lower than its
steady state value of 8.01%.
The other wealth shares we study do not exhibit a pattern of overshooting,
with the wealth shares of both the top 1% and top 0.1% first increasing (for
29 and 13 periods, respectively) and then decreasing and converging to their
steady state values (see Figures 5 and 6).
Insert Figures 4 to 6 around here
Here are the main conclusions we can draw from these results. First, we
observe convergence to the steady state, with this convergence happening
more quickly for r, w and the capital output ratio, and more slowly for
wealth shares. Second, during convergence, we may observe overshooting,
with a variable crossing its steady state value. Third, and perhaps more
important, the evolution of several variables is not monotone with time. For
instance, even though the wealth shares of the top 1% and top 0.1% are above
their steady states values at the beginning of time, they keep on increasing
for, respectively, 29 and 13 years before peaking up and then starting their
downward convergence to their steady state levels. The main message of this
section is then that, even when convergence occurs, the non-monotonicity
of wealth shares (and other variables such as interest rate, wage or capital
output ratio) makes the task of the econometrician extremely diffi cult, since
even the observation of several decades of increasing wealth shares does not
mean that we are converging to a higher steady state, but rather the opposite.
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Finally, we have studied the sensitivity of our results to the value taken
by two parameters: the elasticity of substitution δ and the standard of living
level c0. The impact of the elasticity of substitution δ on the results is
inconsequential, as the steady state values of w, r, K/y and of the various
wealth shares remain practically constant as we vary δ from 0.85 to 1.25 (see
Table A2.1 in Annex 2). This shows that the debate about the value of δ,
following Piketty (2014), is somewhat moot, at least for our formulation of
the economy.
This is in stark contrast with the very large impact of the expected stan-
dard of living c0 on the steady state results, as reported in Table 3.
Wealth shares
c0 w r K/y ws̄/y 0-50 50-90 90-99 top 1%
$100,000 $67,750 6.32% 4.45 0.629 0 8.01% 66.63% 25.36%
$85,000 $75,971 4.82% 5.28 0.640 0 40.23% 47.17% 12.6%
$70,000 $93,281 2.66% 7.30 0.660 12.57% 52.83% 28.32% 6.27%
$55,000 $108,034 1.47% 9.38 0.675 25.06% 48.94% 21.59% 4.41%
Table 3: Steady state results as a function of c0
As the standard of living c0 decreases from $100,000 to $55,000, the mid-
dle class starts accumulating capital, resulting in a more-than-doubling of
the capital/output ratio. As a consequence, the equilibrium rate of return
of capital decreases while the equilibrium wage increases. The labor share of
income in GNP (ws̄/y) increases, although in a less spectacular fashion than
w. The impact of a lower c0 on wealth shares is tremendous, with a quarter
of capital accruing at steady state to the bottom half of the distribution,
one half to the patrimonial middle class, and with the share of the top 1%
decreasing by a factor five!
Indeed the dramatic results from decreasing c0 in the model would seem to
support the views, of those like Skildesky and Skildesky (2012), who see a so-
lution to capitalism’s ills in the reduction of consumption. We do not believe,
however, that a mass reduction in desired consumption levels is sociologically
feasible or desirable. The steady-state savings rate with c0 = $55, 000 is 19%,
which seems quite incompatible with the consumerist nature of American
capitalism.
We now introduce rates of return which vary with the amount of individ-
ual capital invested.
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3 Differential rates of return
Large capitals earn significantly higher rates of return than small ones, as
shown with data from US university endowments (Piketty 2014), US foun-
dations (Saez and Zucman 2014), Forbes global wealth rankings (Piketty
and Zucman 2015), or administrative data from Scandinavian countries (see
Fagereng et al (2015, 2016) for Norway and Bach et al (2015) for Sweden).
In this section, we ask whether steady states continue to exist with differ-
ential rates of return. To do so, we make a very simple assumption, that the
rate of return is some number r1 for wealths accruing to those individuals in
the bottom 99% of the wealth distribution, and kr1 for those in the top 1%,
where k is a parameter greater than one.9 We assume that the average rate
of return, r, continues to clear the capital market.












where q99 is the 99th centile of the distribution F , which is also the 99th
centile of the wealth distribution in our model. The equations derived in
section 2.2 for r, K∗, w and s1 remain identical. However, equation (18) for




(1− τ)ws+ τ(ws̄+ rK∗)− c0
γ(s)










1−α − kr1(1− τ) if s ≥ q99.
A steady state exists for a value k > 1 if we can solve simultaneously the
equations (20), (21), and the equations (13) to (16) in section 2.2 that define
K∗, r, w and s1. Since r, w and s1 are expressed as functions of K∗, and
K∗ =
∫
(1− τ)ws+ τ(ws̄+ rK∗)− c0
γ(s)
dF (s) (22)
by integrating (21), this requires only solving the two simultaneous equations
(20) and (22) for K∗ and r1.
9This assumption is in line with the empirical literature referred above, where differ-
entiated rates of returns are significant especially for the top of the wealth distribution.
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We know there is a solution when k = 1 (the previous section). What
happens as k increases? Computation shows that a steady state exists for
all values of k > 1. We do not prove this analytically, but demonstrate it,
hopefully convincingly, by reporting the solution to equations (20) and (22)
for many values of k in Table 4.
Wealth shares
k r1 kr1 γ1 γ2 50th-90th 90th-99th top 1% top .1%
1 6.32% 6.32% 0.0089 0.0089 8.01% 66.63% 25.36% 4.51%
1.1 6.10% 6.71% 0.0103 0.0064 6.92% 57.52% 35.56% 6.32%
1.3 5.43% 7.06% 0.0147 0.0041 4.85% 40.36% 54.79% 9.74%
1.5 4.77% 7.16% 0.019 0.0035 3.76% 31.27% 64.97% 11.55%
2 3.58% 7.23% 0.027 0.0030 2.67% 22.21% 75.12% 13.35%
2.5 2.9% 7.25% 0.031 0.0029 2.29% 19.06% 78.65% 13.98%
3 2.42% 7.26% 0.034 0.0028 2.08% 17.28% 80.65% 14.32%
5 1.46% 7.27% 0.041 0.0027 1.76% 14.65% 83.59% 14.86%
10 0.73% 7.28% 0.045 0.0026 1.58% 13.12% 85.31% 15.16%
Table 4: Steady state allocation as a function of k
We do not report the values of r, K∗, w and s1 in Table 4 because they
are not affected by the value of k, and are thus the same as in the preceding
section. We observe that r1 decreases with k, and we now show that it
converges to 0 as k becomes large. If this were not the case, since the left-





must tend to zero as k becomes large, which is clearly false from the defini-





(1− α)(1− τ) = 7.69%,
which is the value that renders γ2 = 0. In other words, γ2 never becomes
negative —for that would indicate the non-existence of a steady state.
Observe from Table 4 that r1 plunges from 6.3% to 0.7% as k increases
from 1 to 10, but that kr1 does not increase very much, moving from 6.3%
to 7.3%. Even though the absolute level of the return on wealth of the top
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1% does not increase much, the wealth shares of various groups change a lot
with k. The wealth shares of the top 1% and top 0.1% increase with k, at
the expense of the shares of the patrimonial middle class and of the 90th
to 99th centiles in the wealth distribution. It is striking that steady state
wealth shares are very sensitive to k when k is low: an increase in k from 1
to 1.3 more than doubles the steady state wealth shares of both the top 1%
and the top 0.1%! In other words, a rate premium of 30% for the top 1%
results in more than half of total wealth being concentrated among them (up
from a quarter with identical rates of return for all).
Since r1 → 0 as k becomes large, it follows that γ1 → g/(1−α), and from
equation (22) that the wealth of the bottom 99% approaches∫
(1− τ)ws+ τ(ws̄+ rK∗)− c0
g/(1− α) dF (s).
Dividing this number by K∗ from Table 1, we conclude that, as k → ∞,
the wealth share of the top 1% approaches 86.7% . In Figure 7, we report
calculation of the wealth share of the top 1% for steady states up to k = 20.
The figure bears out our conjecture that the limiting value of the top wealth
share is 86.7%.
Insert Figure 7: Wealth share of the top 1%, steady states for 3 ≤ k ≤ 20
We now say a quick word about the convergence pattern to the steady
state when one starts with the wealth distribution obtained from Saez and
Zucman (2016), as in the preceding section. Fixing a value of k > 1, we
do observe the same type of convergence as the one reported in section 2.4,
namely a non-monotone convergence to their steady state values for the in-
terest rate, the wage, capital stock, and some wealth shares. The conclusions
obtained in this section regarding convergence then carry through to the
introduction of differentiated rates of return.
We summarize the results of this section as follows. First, as the rate of
return to wealths in the top 1% becomes an arbitrarily high multiple of the
rate of return to wealths in the bottom 99%, steady states continue to exist,
where incomes and wealths grow at the rate g. Second, the values of K∗, r,
w and s1 are independent of how capital income is distributed among owners
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of capital. Third, the wealth share of the top 1% increases very fast with k
for low values of k, and approaches an asymptotic value less than one when
k becomes very large. Fourth, the convergence pattern studied in section 2.4
carries through to the case of differentiated rates of return on wealth.
The fact that the fundamental values K∗, r, w and s, are independent of
how returns to capital are distributed reflects a particular view about the role
of the financial sector. Competitive forces determine the fundamentals of the
economy, and the role of the financial sector, which expends great energy in
seeking high returns for wealthy clients, is simply to allocate profits in favor
of their clients. In our models, the financial sector is unproductive, as the
well known quip by Paul Volcker asserts.
We now move to the introduction of social mobility.
4 Social mobility
4.1 Analytical model
We now introduce death and inheritance. When an adult dies, we assume
that his capital passes (untaxed) to his only child. However, the child will not
in general have the skill/income capacity of the father. We use the 100X100
intergenerational income mobility matrix of Chetty et al (2014) to model this
process.10 An element pij of this matrix is the fraction of sons of fathers at
the ith centile of the income distribution who have incomes at the jth centile
of their cohort’s income distribution. Indeed, we assume that the matrix
P = {pij} defines the mobility of skill, hence earned income.
To describe the dynamics, let us first suppose that all fathers die at once
at the beginning of the year. If an s father dies at the beginning of year t, his
son inherits St−1(s). The son will be economically active beginning in year t.
The sons are distributed on the skill distribution F according to P . Denote
by Qi the ith centile of F , comprising a small interval of skills. Let s ∈ Qi
and s′ ∈ Qj. Then the ‘number’of sons who inherit from fathers of skill s
and end up at skill level s′ will be equal to 100pijf(s)f(s′). Integrating this
10Online Data Table 1: National 100 by 100 transition matrix, available online at
http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/website/v2.1/online_data_tables.xls. We use the
transpose of the matrix therein.
18










which is the correct number of sons of s fathers who end up at Qj. If we add
up these numbers over all j, we have∑
j
pijf(s) = f(s),
which is the total number of sons whose fathers were of skill s.
Now let’s look at all fathers s ∈ Qi. The number of sons who end up at









which is the correct number of sons at s′.
We now compute the total wealth inherited by children when their fathers’
estates pass to them. We are interested in the total savings at a generic skill
level s′ in the son’s generation. These savings come from fathers’wealth at
date t − 1, so these are the savings at the beginning of date t for the sons,
before they have augmented their savings with their own income (which will
be with wages at skill level s′). The amount of inheritance at each value of







St−1(s)f(s)ds ≡ S̃t−1(s′), for s′ ∈ Qj, j = 1, ..., 100. (23)
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We now drop the assumption that all fathers die at the beginning of the
year, and suppose, instead, that a fraction q of all fathers die at each skill
level at the beginning of each year. Thus the capital at end of date t at skill
level s will be an average of the capital of those who did not die and of the
newly inheriting sons who arrive at skill level s. The average capital at skill
level s at the end of the year is
St(s) = (1− q)St−1(s) + qS̃t−1(s) + It(s). (24)
The quantity in the first part of this convex combination is the average wealth
of those who do not die at the beginning of date t—call it ‘survivors’capital’—
and S̃t−1(s) is the average wealth of sons who join type s at the beginning of
date t.
However, we do not attempt to keep track of the heterogeneity of wealth
at each skill level that occurs as a result of death and inheritance. We only
track average wealth at each skill level. Thus, we aggregate at each skill level
s at each date, and assign everyone of that skill level the average amount of
capital from (24). If you are the son of a wealthy father, your inheritance
will add wealth to the cohort at your skill level, but it will not benefit you
especially.
The equations summarizing the model are the same equations given at
the end of section 2.1, except that we substitute equation (24) for (4) for
the intergenerational transmission of wealth, making use of equation (23)
defining the wealth of an inheriting son, at the beginning of date t, whose
own skill level is s′.
As for solving the model, we proceed as previously up to and including
the solving of consumption and investment. S̃t−1(.) is then determined by
(23), and finally, St(.) is determined by (24).
4.2 Numerical Results: Steady state and convergence
We now simulate the model, beginning with the Saez-Zucman (2016) wealth
function for the US in 2012 as S0(s). We let 2% of the population die each
year (thus, q = 0.02). The simulation results are to be compared with those
in Figures 1-6, pertaining to our vanilla model.
Add Figures 8 to 13 around here:
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It appears as if the model approaches a steady state (see figures 8 to 13).
It is not as easy as previously to prove this, and we defer to Annex 3 for the
analytical definition of a steady state and its solution with social mobility.
We report in Table 5 the steady state allocations with and without social
mobility, the latter corresponding to section 2.2.
Steady state Without With





bottom 50% 0% 0.54%
50th-90th 8% 0.86%
top 1% 25.4% 40.97%
top 0.1% 4.5% 8.49%
Table 5: Steady state allocation with and without social mobility
Perhaps the most significant result is that the capital-income ratio con-
verges to a far smaller level than in the vanilla model: K/y appears to con-
verge to around 2.6 as opposed to 4.45 in the vanilla model. The reason for
this is quite clear. Many sons of wealthy fathers themselves have low earning
power, and they consume their inheritance. Correspondingly, because of the
scarcity of capital, the interest rate converges to a much higher number here,
about 13.6%, than in the vanilla model. In this model, then, r > g with a
vengeance in the steady state. The relative paucity of labor means that the
wage, normalized by the growth rate converges to $45,300 per annum, far
less than the wage in the vanilla model (normalized by the growth factor),
which converges to $67,700 per annum. Labor’s income share also decreases
compared to the basic version of the model. Thus, ironically, the churn-
ing of capital via inheritance renders the working class relatively worse off
than without churning, because low-wage inheritors ‘squander’their wealth,
and capital becomes relatively scarce. We are reminded of Marglin’s (1974)
proposition that the social function of capitalists is to accumulate.
We next present in Table 5 the values to which the wealth shares of
various quantiles appear to converge in the steady state. For the first time,
the bottom half of the population accumulates some wealth: this is due to
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churning. They end up with about 0.5% of total wealth. The patrimonial
middle class is immiserated: they end up after 300 years with 0.86% of the
total wealth. As a consequence, the wealth share of the top decile converges
to around 98% of the total wealth.
As for the convergence process to this steady state, Figures 8 to 13 show
that it is non monotonic for several variables, with overshooting of the steady
state values for several variables such as w, r andK/y. The non-monotonicity
is especially visible for the wealth share of the top 1%. Even though we start
from a value which is close to the steady state level, the wealth share decreases
over 50 periods to 35%, and then increases towards the steady state level of
41%.
The impact of lowering c0 from $100,000 to $50,000 is reported in Table
6 and is similar to what we obtained in the base case model. Halving the
expected standard of living allows the middle class to start accumulating,
resulting in a capital/output ratio increasing by a factor close to four. The
rate of return on capital decreases tenfold to 1.3%, while the wage rate more
than doubles to $110,000. As for wealth shares, the bottom half accumulates
more than a third of total wealth, and the patrimonial middle class close to
45%. The decrease in top wealth shares is especially impressive.
Steady state





bottom 50% 37.14% 0.54%
50th-90th 44.91% 0.86%
top 1% 2.66% 40.97%
top 0.1% 0.36% 8.49%
Table 6: Steady state allocations with social mobility as a function of c0
The society that we describe after 300 years of capital churning and a
standard of living of $100,000 is in all likelihood not one that we will ever
see. First, it is hard to imagine that an economy would be sustainable in
which over 95% of the wealth accrues to the top decile. Secondly, the wealth-
income ratio, of below three, does not seem to be one that would evolve. We
attribute these unrealistic results to the rather unrefined process of inheri-
tance that we used. First of all, we have used the Chetty et al (2014) income
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to income intergenerational transition matrix (specified in terms of father’s
and son’s ranks) rather than an earnings to earnings matrix, which is what
we really require for our model. What we need is a mapping from father’s
labor earnings to son’s labor earnings, which we do not have. Secondly, when
a son inherits, his capital is shared by the entire earnings cohort to which
he belongs. We adopted this procedure because it is far simpler than keep-
ing track of individual inheritances, which would introduce heterogeneity of
wealth among the members of each skill cohort. Thirdly, we have ignored
assortative mating, which would considerably reduce capital churning. Re-
pairing these short-cuts would, we presume, give us a more realistic picture
of the effects of intergenerational mobility on the distribution of wealth.
5 Taxing capital
We finally study the effect of capital taxation by examining the steady states
generated at different capital levies. Denote by τ 1 a per annum tax on the
individual’s wealth, collected at date t but upon wealth at date t − 1. We
choose to levy the tax only on the top decile of the distribution. We amend
the vanilla model of section 2: thus, there is no intergenerational mobility,
and there is one rate of return on capital. The revenues from the capital tax
will be distributed as a demogrant to the entire population.
At the steady state, it will continue to be true that those who invest
positively will be exactly those types for whom y∗(s) > c0. We continue
to denote by s1 the largest type whose savings are zero in the steady state.
Thus in the steady state, S∗(s) remains given by equation (17) which can be
expressed for s ≥ s1 as
S∗(s) =































is the steady-state value of capital held by the top decile, and where w, r,
and K∗ are steady-state values. In the income term in (25), we collect the
capital tax if and only if s ≥ q90, but everyone receives the demogrant τ 1Λ∗.





(1− τ)ws+ τws̄+ τrK∗ + τ 1Λ∗ − c0
g
1−α − r(1− τ) + 1[q90,∞](s)τ 1
)
for s ≥ s1. (26)







The upper bound of types who save zero in steady state is defined by
s1 =
c0 − τ (ws̄+ rK∗)− τ 1Λ∗
(1− τ)w .
We integrate equation (26) over the interval [s1,∞) . The left-hand side
becomes K∗ by equation (27). This new equation contains two unknowns,
K∗ and Λ∗: note that w, r, and s1 are all functions of K∗ and Λ∗. Secondly,
we integrate equation (26) over the interval [q90,∞): then the left-hand side
of the new equation is Λ∗, and thus we have a second equation in K∗ and Λ∗.
We now solve these two equations simultaneously for K∗ and Λ∗, for various
values of the capital tax τ 1. A solution is the steady-state that we seek.11
We calculated steady states for values of the capital levy between 0 and
3%. In this interval, the bottom half of the population continues to accumu-
late zero wealth: they use the capital levy demogrant to augment consump-
tion. However, the fortunes of the patrimonial middle class, from the 50th to
90th centile, improve dramatically. In Figure 14, we plot the wealth shares
of three quantile groups of the population at the steady state, as a function
of the capital levy. With an increase of the wealth tax from zero to 3%, the
wealth share of the middle class increases from below 10% to almost 70%;
obviously, this is at the expense of the top decile.
11The procedure described is the correct one as long as s1 ≤ q90. This turns out to be
the case in the region that we examine. If s1 > q90, a slightly different procedure must be
used.
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Insert Figures 14 to 18 around here
In figures 15, 16 and 17, we plot the interest rate, capital-output ratio and
labor’s share in national income as a function of the capital tax. It appears
that most of the action occurs as the tax increases from zero to 1%. These
variables are all quite stable in the higher part of the range, although the
wealth shares continue to change quite dramatically.
The lesson seems to be that quite moderate capital taxation (vastly short
of full appropriation of capital) has a dramatic effect on the fortunes of the
middle class, but no effect on the wealth of the bottom half, who continue to
own nothing. Their consumption, however, increases due to the capital levy
demogrant. Evidently, other strategies must be used to create wealth for the
bottom half of the income distribution.
What is the relative size of the demogrant from taxing capital income,
which is τrK∗, and from the capital levy, which is τ 1Λ∗? We plot these two
demogrants in figure 18. We see that at a 3% capital levy, the capital-stock
demogrant is only about one-third the value of the capital-income demogrant.
As Piketty (2014) emphasizes, a principal value to having a capital stock
tax, even a small one, is that it would establish statistics on the distribution
of the wealth, which would presumably invigorate the social movement for
redistribution.
6 Conclusion
We close by drawing attention to some key points. We believe modeling
consumers as seeking to reach a socially acceptable and culturally determined
level of consumption, which we denoted c0, and beyond that accumulating
wealth for its own sake, in addition to augmenting consumption, is a good
approximation to reality in a capitalist society in which high consumption
and accumulation of wealth are prized as signals of success. In the vanilla
model (section 2) and its three variants, steady states always exist. Although
the top quantiles of the distribution can own, in the limit, large fractions of
total wealth, these steady-state values are less than unity. When there are
differential rates of return to capital, depending on the size of the investment,
even if the top 1% receive a rate of return that is an arbitrarily high factor
of that received by the bottom 99%, the top 1% does not in the limit own
all the capital.
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Not only do steady states exist in all our variants, but it appears that
convergence to the steady state occurs from an arbitrary initial distribution
of wealth following our dynamics. This is a conjecture, stimulated by our
simulations. A proof would presumably show that the mapping of the wealth
function at date t to date t + 1 is a contraction mapping. We illustrate
convergence to the steady state from the 2012 wealth distribution of Saez
and Zucman (2016). Two features are noteworthy: convergence takes a very
long time, and in several variables of interest it is not monotonic. This
non-monotonicity illustrates another theme from Piketty (2014): that it is
imprudent to attempt to deduce general dynamical laws of capitalism from
time series that are short.
Intergenerational mobility provides some wealth to the bottom half, but it
also increases the wealth concentration at the top. This is apparently due to
the fact that when wealth travels down the distribution through low-earning
children inheriting from wealthy fathers, it is largely consumed rather than
saved. A capital tax levied on the top decile at a modest rate (below 3%),
and redistributed as a demogrant, has a very dramatic effect on the wealth
share owned by the middle class, which increases from 10% to 70%. It has
no effect on the wealth held by the bottom half, who consume the demogrant
in an attempt to reach the consumption level.
Finally, the only variant we studied that succeeds in creating wealth for
the bottom half of the distribution is a reduction in the level of c0. If c0 is
halved, from $100,000 to $50,000 per annum, the bottom 90% of the distrib-
ution converge to owning 75% of the wealth —almost their per capita share.
Aside from the fact that austerity of this kind would have massive negative
effects on employment during the transition to a new equilibrium, we do not
believe the strategy is psychologically feasible in the US. We conjecture that
a lower c0 may correspond to the social compact in Europe. If that is so, we
can predict a quite different long-run distribution of wealth in Europe, and
a higher capital/output ratio in Europe than in the US.
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Annex 1: Calibration of the CES production function




















Taking K/y = 4.5 and capital’s share in income rK/y = 0.28 (both from
Piketty (2014)), (28) reduces to
a = (0.28 + 0.09)(4.5)0.176A0.176. (29)















using the facts that total income is 16.8X109 in thousands of dollars and the
size of the labor force is 155X106 (so that income per worker is $108,300).
Solving (29) and (30) simultaneously, we obtain (a,A)=(0.636,4.804).
Annex 2: Impact of elasticity of substitution on the
steady state in the vanilla model
Wealth shares
δ w r K/y ws̄/y 0-50 50-90 90-99 top 1%
0.85 $67,750 6.321% 4.454 0.629 0 8.01% 66.63% 25.36%
0.95 $67,760 6.320% 4.450 0.630 0 8.00% 66.63% 25.37%
1.05 $67,770 6.317% 4.446 0.630 0 8.00% 66.63% 25.37%
1.15 $67,779 6.316% 4.442 0.631 0 7.99% 66.64% 25.37%
1.25 $67,788 6.314% 4.438 0.631 0 7.98% 66.64% 25.38%
Table A2.1: Steady state results in vanilla model as a function of δ
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Annex 3: Computation of the steady state with in-
tergenerational mobility
We solve analytically for the steady state with intergenerational mobility,
which according to simulations, appears to exist. Substituting equation (23)








We have introduced some new notation in (31) for clarification. C(s) is the
quantile of distribution F to which s belongs. Consequently, C−1(i) is the
set of workers whose skills are in the ith quantile of F . If there is a steady

































The diffi cult part is that the last term on the r.h.s. of (33) will have
a zero value for all quantiles j who eat up their entire savings each period
(these will be low-skilled sons who recently inherited, but not enough to reach
the required consumption of c0) and it will have a positive value for those
who have a lot of savings or high earnings. We have no way of guessing at
what quantile j this break occurs. (And the break itself is approximate —
it will almost surely be the case that some part of the critical quantile will
actually invest positively, and the other part will not.) Forgetting this last
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complication, we can say that we will have, for some quantile j∗:





























Our procedure is to guess the value of j∗ by examining our 300 period
simulation result. We see there that at the end of that simulation, the only
quantiles that are consuming more than c0, normalized by the growth factor
(1 + g)299, are centiles 92 through 100.12 Thus, in the steady state, the first
91 centiles are consuming their entire savings at each date, following our
consumption rule.
We now insert (34) into equation (33), and, after a little re-arranging to
combine like terms in the β’s, write these equations as
























System (36)-(37) comprises 100 linear equations in the {βj}. There are
in addition the unknowns r, w and K∗, but r and w are functions of K∗ via
12This does not contradict the observation made in section 4.2 that the bottom 90%
accumulates some wealth at the steady state. This wealth is indeed inherited from fathers,
but eaten up by sons in their attempt to reach the standard of living c0.
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A solution to these equations is a steady state of the model. We cannot
expect to have a perfect solution, because of the problem mentioned above
equation (34): that some members of the critical quantile j∗ will be negative
savers and some positive savers. This could only be addressed by having a
continuous transition matrix.
We attempted to verify that our simulations produced an approximate
steady state as follows. We took the savings function at the 300th iteration
of the program, and computed the 100 dimensional vector β using it, and
also the values r, w and K∗. We then computed the 100 linear equations
(36)-(37). The error is small. Instead of the vector zero (of dimension 100)
we got a vector of length 0.39. The average length of the deviation from the
zero vector along any dimension is 0.012.
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Figure 1: Basic model, convergence of r







Figure 2: Basic model, convergence of w








Figure 3: Basic model, convergence of capitaloutput ratio










Figure 4: Basic model, convergence of patrimonial middle class wealth share







Wealth share top 1%
Figure 5: Basic model, convergence of top 1% wealth share







Wealth share top 0.1%
Figure 6: Basic model, convergence of top 0.1% wealth share










Wealth share top 1%
Figure 7: Top 1% wealth share as a function of k







Figure 8: Convergence of r with social mobility








Figure 9: Convergence of w with social mobility








Figure 10: Convergence of capitaloutput ratio with social mobility







Figure 11: q50 to q90 wealth share with social mobility









Figure 12: q90 to q99 wealth share with social mobility
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Wealth share top 1%
Figure 13: Top 1% wealth share with social mobility










Figure 15: Interest rate as function of capital levy








Figure 16: Capital-output ratio as function of capital levy






Labor's share of GNP
Figure 17: Labor share as a function of capital levy
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Figure 18: Demogrants as a function of capital levy
Capital stock demogrant
Capital income demogrant
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